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A B S T R A C T   
Increased safety has been advocated as one of the major benefits of the introduction of Automated Driving 
Systems (ADSs). Incorporation of ADSs in vehicles means that associated software has safety critical application, 
thus requiring exhaustive testing. To prove ADSs are safer than human drivers, some work has suggested that 
they will need to be driven for over 11 billion miles. The number of test miles driven is not, by itself, a mean-
ingful metric for judging the safety of ADSs. Rather, the types of scenarios encountered by the ADSs during 
testing are critically important. 
With a Hazard Based Testing approach, this paper proposes that the extent to which testing miles are ‘smart 
miles’ that reflect hazard-based scenarios relevant to the way in which an ADS fails or handles hazards is a 
fundamental, if not pivotal, consideration for safety-assurance of ADSs. Using Systems Theoretic Process Analysis 
(STPA) method as a foundation, an extension to the STPA method has been developed to identify test scenarios. 
The approach has been applied to a real-world case study of a SAE Level 4 Low-Speed Automated Driving system 
(a.k.a. a shuttle). This paper, discusses the STPA analysis and a newly-developed test scenarios creation method 
derived from STPA.   
1. Introduction 
The last few decades have seen an increase in the amount of auto-
mation in safety critical systems in various industries e.g. aviation, 
manufacturing, automotive etc. In the automotive domain, the intro-
duction of automation is driven by its many potential benefits like 
increased safety [9,19,52] among others. While introduction of auto-
mation has a potential to increase safety in various domains including 
automotive, they also add complexity especially in cyber-physical sys-
tems, requiring new risk assessment and safety verification methods for 
such systems [4,28,63]. The aviation industry approaches safety 
assessment by placing high safety integrity targets throughout the 
product development and use cycle [13]. However, compared to 6.5 
million lines of code in a Boeing 787 airplane, current luxury cars (even 
without high levels of automation) have over 100 million lines of code 
[7,51]. The introduction of Advanced Driver Assistance Systems 
(ADASs) and Automated Driving Systems (ADSs) is further increasing 
the complexity manyfold [10]. 
One of the main challenges in evaluating risk and safety of complex 
systems with safety critical applications is that the knowledge of overall 
(system level) activity is poor [22]. Another trade-off for such complex 
systems is the balance between “mission completion”, “mission abort” and 
“system or occupant survival” [36,38]. Traditional methods view a 
complex system as a collection of independent components with linear 
relationships. However, one of the key features of complex systems is 
non-linearity and the dependent nature of causal links caused by feed-
back loops. Many real-world systems even display probabilistic depen-
dence between sub-systems [59], thus requiring safety to be treated as 
an emergent property [44]. With complex systems (e.g. ADSs), accidents 
emerge due to the diverse interactions with a wide and open system [2]. 
These difficulties which emerge from traditional methods, like event 
tree analysis, fault tree analysis, and bow-tie diagrams, suggest the need 
for new approaches [8,12]. 
In the automotive domain, for ADSs, it is suggested that there will be 
a need to drive ADSs for more than 11 billion miles in order to prove that 
ADSs are safer than human drivers [24]. Moreover, even after 11 billion 
miles, such testing will “only assure safety but not always ensure it” [54], 
thus suggesting vehicle level testing or real world testing before start of 
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production (SOP) wouldn’t be enough to prove safety of the automated 
driving systems [31,58]. While average customers are willing to pay up 
to $3500 for partial automation in their cars and $4900 for full auto-
mation [11], it is essential to provide them with true information about 
system limitations and capabilities to ensure safe and correct use and 
trust in the system [25]. 
One of the reasons behind suggesting the requirement of 11 billion 
miles to prove the safety of ADSs is that it would potentially reveal all 
possible “black swan” and known unknown scenarios or unexpected po-
tential accidents. Identification of such scenarios remains an issue for 
test engineers and risk analysts dealing with complex systems [3]. 
Another factor is the lack of a standard set of validation metrics [56]. 
“Black swan” scenarios by their very definition may or may not be 
discovered even with 11 billion miles. This has also led to an increasing 
concern among the regulatory organisations about failures which have 
low probability and high consequences [50]. Therefore, rather than 
focussing on the number of miles, it is critically important to focus the 
research on the identification of the “black swan” (a.k.a. unknown un-
knowns) and “known unknown” scenarios. 
Although requirements based testing captures the “known knowns” 
efficiently, the inability to ensure its completeness leads to the occur-
rence of “unknown knowns”, “known unknowns” and the “black swan” 
scenarios. The latter three together could possibly be combined to form 
“interesting” scenarios, and to define such scenarios should be the goal 
for testers. 
While it might be unfeasible to achieve 11 billion miles driven by 
ADSs, testing does have a role to play and it is important to understand 
not only the quantity of miles but also the quality of those miles in terms 
of achieving testing objectives. One might attempt a safety claim by 
driving 11 billion miles on a straight road on a sunny day in the middle 
of the desert. However, such testing may not be sufficient or even 
relevant for ADASs and ADSs to be deployed in environments where 
Vulnerable Road Users (VRUs) are present, or where it rains/snows 
heavily. Therefore, number of miles driven by itself is insufficient as a 
basis for a safety claim. The nature of scenarios comprising those miles 
(i.e. quality of those miles), becomes fundamental to an assessment of 
safety. Additionally, it is important to test the ADASs or ADSs in the 
Operational Design Domain (ODD) they have been designed for (e.g. a 
low-speed automated shuttle designed for urban environment should be 
tested in urban settings and not in the middle of a desert). While the aim 
of testing should be to increase the coverage of “known known” scenarios 
by better specification, one of the challenges of identifying “black swan” 
scenarios is their lack of correlation with time [58], suggesting their 
ad-hoc nature and their unpredictability. 
Therefore, in order to ensure that the systems have a safe and a 
robust functionality, it is important to be able to define test scenarios 
which are able to: 1) trigger real-world use sequence 2) represent user 
input values 3) define and identify “all” operating conditions. However, 
lack of standardized methods for test scenario definition or classifica-
tion, and the lack of international standards to define safety re-
quirements for ADASs and ADSs, have led to a subjective interpretation 
of test scenarios and desired “safety” levels, particularly for ADASs and 
ADSs in vehicles [28]. 
1.1. Hazard Based Testing 
It is suggested that for ADASs and ADSs, it is more important to 
identify “how a systems fails (or misbehaves)” as compared to “how a 
system works” [26]. Subsequently, in order to identify the smart miles, a 
Hazard Based Testing (HBT) approach was introduced to complement 
the traditional requirements based testing approach used in the auto-
motive domain [26]. With a focus on failures (and misbehaviour), HBT 
has a potential to identify the “black swan” scenarios. The aim of using 
hazard based test scenarios is to increase the “known knowns” space and 
decrease the “unknown unknowns” space. A HBT approach has the 
following steps:  
1. Identification of hazards  
2. Creating test scenarios for the identified hazards  
3. Pass criteria for the created test scenarios 
Having determined that there is a need to identify hazards in order to 
conduct HBT, various hazard identification methods were explored. 
Hazard analysis methods help in identifying future causes of accidents 
for a system under analysis. There are various hazard analysis methods 
(e.g. Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) ([14]; Gary G. [18]), 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [23,57], Event Tree Analysis (ETA), HAZOP 
[6] and STPA [34,35]. The limitations of the first four methods espe-
cially in ADASs and ADSs context led to the use of Systems Theoretic 
Process Analysis (STPA) as the hazard identification method for this 
work. The advantages of STPA over other hazard identification methods 
are discussed in section 2. 
1.2. Research Question 
Inspired by Hazard Based Testing, this paper aims to answer the 
following two research questions:  
• How to identify hazards for ADASs and ADSs?  
• How to create test scenarios for ADASs and ADSs for the identified 
hazards? 
This paper is organized in six sections. Section 2 discusses the STPA 
method, section 3 introduces the extension to STPA to create test sce-
narios and corresponding pass criteria, section 4 illustrates the results 
from a real-world case study of the application of the proposed method, 
section 5 provides a discussion on the results and the paper concludes 
with a conclusion in section 6. 
2. Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) 
Systems Theoretic Process Analysis or STPA is a hazardous event 
identification method which is based on the accident causality model 
called STAMP (Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Processes) which 
in turn is grounded in systems theory and control theory [33,34]. It is 
designed to analyse safety in a socio-technical system with diverse 
interacting elements [34]. With foundations in a systems based 
approach, STPA identifies a broader range of hazards which may occur 
due to a variety of reasons including component failures, component 
interactions, human-error, human-automation interaction, software is-
sues, incorrect requirements and even socio-technical and organisa-
tional factors. One of the key benefits of STPA is that it allows the person 
performing the analysis to identify the causal factors of the hazards and 
their corresponding requirements that if implemented, would prevent 
the hazard from occurring. Therefore, it supports the identification of 
preventive actions for a hazard and not just its downstream mitigation 
(as in other methods). 
Unlike other methods like FMEA, FTA and ETA which are focussed 
on identifying downstream effects of failures or chain of events, STPA 
addresses failures as well as non-failures that lead to losses including 
interactions among components and systems operating exactly as 
designed and providing functions exactly as specified. One of the sig-
nificant benefits of using STPA is its capacity to identify diverse causal 
factors (component failures, component interactions, requirements 
flaws, human-errors, design flaws, societal issues, organizational issues 
etc.) [16,34]. It is important to acknowledge that the quality of the STPA 
results is dependent on the quality of the information and the knowledge 
used to perform the analysis, as with any hazard analysis method [47]. 
While STPA has been used widely in aviation [5,15,48], space in-
dustry [21], marine industry [45,60], military applications, railways 
[43], organisational [43], but its application in the automotive domain 
is fairly recent. This is partly because there are other established 
methods (e.g. FMEA, FTA, HAZOP etc.) with corresponding software 
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tools that are embedded in current safety processes. While there are a 
number of STPA software tools available, they are relatively new [42]. 
As ADASs and ADSs are complex systems in which hazards can occur due 
to a number of reasons (mentioned earlier), STPA offers the most com-
plete set of hazards [41]. Thus, STPA was chosen as the method of choice 
for hazard identification. Hazard identification is the first step of hazard 
based testing. 
STPA is a four step process. The first step is to define the purpose of 
the analysis. These include: 1) what kinds of losses will the analysis aim 
to prevent; 2) will STPA be applied only to traditional safety goals like 
preventing loss of human life or will it be applied more broadly to se-
curity, privacy, performance, and other system properties? The second 
step is to build a model of the system called a control structure, which 
captures functional relationships and interactions by modelling the 
system as a set of feedback control loops. The third step is to analyse 
control actions in the control structure to examine how they could lead 
to the losses defined in the first step, and create functional requirements 
and constraints for the system. The fourth step identifies loss scenarios to 
explain why unsafe control and other unsafe behaviours might occur in 
the system. 
2.1. STPA Step 1: Defining the purpose of analysis 
Step one involves defining the purpose of the analysis and defining 
the system (at a high level) that is to be analysed. It also involves 
identifying high level “losses” or accidents for the system, which need to 
be avoided along with potential system hazards. These losses may 
include loss of human life or loss of quality of service (e.g. longer trip 
journey, incomplete trip journey, etc.) or may include security, privacy 
and performance concerns. It should be noted that only the types of 
losses are required at this stage and not the number in each type, for 
example number of crashes is not required. Following the losses, cor-
responding system hazards are also identified (e.g. vehicle does not 
maintain safe distance from nearby objects). 
For ADASs and ADSs, the Operational Design Domain (ODD) of the 
system is defined as “Operating conditions under which a given driving 
automation system or feature thereof is specifically designed to function, 
including, but not limited to, environmental, geographical, and time-of- 
day restrictions, and/or the requisite presence or absence of certain 
traffic or roadway characteristics” [46]. The ODD could provide an input 
to STPA if the ODD has already been specified. Alternatively, the STPA 
results in later steps could be used to create or adjust the ODD as 
appropriate to mitigate loss scenarios. 
2.2. STPA Step 2: Creating system control structure 
In STPA step 2, a hierarchical control structure model of the system is 
created to capture the functional interactions and feedback control 
loops. A control structure generally consists of controllers, actuators, 
sensors, controlled processes, control actions, feedback and data inputs. 
The control structure is refined with various iterations as the system 
requirements are defined and detail is added about the system. A control 
structure for the SAE Level 4 Low-Speed Automated Driving (LSAD) 
system case study is illustrated in section 4.2. 
2.3. STPA Step 3: Identification of UCAs 
After the system level hazards and losses are identified (in step 1), 
and the system control structure is defined (in step 2), STPA step 3 can 
be performed. STPA step 3 identifies Unsafe Control Actions (UCAs) 
including the contexts in which control actions can lead to a hazard or a 
loss. Each control action (identified in the system control structure) is 
analysed to consider four general cases: 
•Not providing a control action causes a loss 
•Providing a control action causes a loss 
•Providing a control action too late, too early or out of sequence 
causes a loss 
•Control action stopped too soon or applied too long causes a loss 
In order to efficiently capture the above analysis to identify UCAs, a 
simple table (Table 1) can be used. In the example in Table 1, the control 
action “destination command” (provided by the occupant to undertake a 
journey) is analysed for the four general cases mentioned earlier. It is 
important to note that a UCA is not just restricted to causing a physical 
accident. Consequences of UCAs include mission losses or inability to 
provide required quality of service (e.g. too long to complete a journey). 
Each element in the table is evaluated against the system hazards 
defined in step 1 (section 2.1), to determine whether it should be clas-
sified as a UCA. For instance, in the example discussed in Table 1, if the 
occupant doesn’t provide the destination command “when the occupant 
doesn’t want to undertake a journey”, no loss is caused. On the other hand, 
when the context is changed to the occupant wanting to undertake a 
journey, not providing the destination command will cause a loss, and is 
hence classified as a UCA. Identification of UCAs in STPA is done on a 
worst case analysis. The analysis doesn’t assume that the system will 
know how to respond safely. On the contrary, the opposite assumption is 
made and the aim of the analysis of UCAs is to identify requirements and 
solutions to either eliminate or mitigate the UCAs. 
Each of the UCAs can then be separately analysed to create system 
safety requirements or identify missing requirements. Additionally, a 
UCA has a defined structure to it, i.e., controller, control action type, 
control action and context (Fig. 1). It is important to maintain this 
structure as the proposed extension for test scenario generation (section 
3) makes use of this UCA structure. In Table 1, each UCA has been linked 
to its corresponding system hazard. Linking UCAs to their corresponding 
system hazards also provides a degree of traceability in the analysis. 
2.4. STPA Step 4: Identifying why UCAs and hazards might occur (Loss 
scenarios) 
After identifying Unsafe Control Actions (UCAs), STPA step 4 in-
volves identification of the causal factors for the UCAs by analysing each 
control loop for each control action in the control structure created in 
step 2. Causal factors are not simply fault states as identified in FMEAs. 
In an FMEA a known failure is analysed to understand the downstream 
effect and the question asked is “what failed”. However, in STPA step 4, 
the question asked is “why did it occur”. This can be explained by the fact 
that STPA offers a preventive outlook to failures and non-failures 
whereas other methods like FMEAs look to mitigate the effect of the 
failure rather than to prevent it. For loss scenarios for every UCA, two 
types of reasons (causal factors) must be considered [35]: a) Type a: why 
would Unsafe Control Actions occur? b) Type b: why would control 
actions be improperly executed or not executed, leading to hazards? 
Table 1 
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Some examples of the factors considered include wrong controller pro-
cess model, software design flaws, incorrect or missing requirements, 
missing/wrong feedback, hardware failures, contradictory control etc. A 
controller process model represents the controller’s internal beliefs used 
to make decisions and may include beliefs about the process being 
controlled or other relevant aspects of the system or the environment 
[35]. Depending on the context, a software error or a hardware failure 
can cause either a type A or a type B scenario. A software fault in a type A 
scenario will be in the controller from which the control action (asso-
ciated to the UCA) is being triggered (i.e. source controller). Software 
fault in a type B scenario will be associated with the controller within the 
actuator system which is receiving the control action from the source 
controller. The STPA Handbook [35], contains more details about the 
STPA process including the differences between type a and type b, and 
how these relate to software errors and hardware failures. 
UCAs can occur due to controller beliefs that are represented by 
process models and acted on by the control algorithm. Thus, the first 
aspect to understand is the process model. Next, the reason(s) for the 
process models’ beliefs are identified. Finally, the situations for the 
corresponding reasons are identified, or for control actions that are 
potentially not followed or executed improperly. Section 4.4 discusses 
the step 4 analysis for UCAs and identifies the loss scenarios. 
3. Extending STPA to create test scenarios 
In this section, a methodology to create test scenarios from the STPA 
output (step 1-4) is introduced. This involves identifying parameters for 
various elements of STPA. First, it is important to understand how a test 
scenario needs to be constructed, or in other words what are the com-
ponents of a test scenario. It is suggested that a test scenario should 
consist of a world, actors and their behaviour [55]. However, for a test 
scenario to be usable for testing, it is essential to know what criteria 
must be met within a test scenario in order for a vehicle to receive a 
"passing" score for its performance or safety. Thus, a complete test sce-
nario definition should also contain the “pass criteria” for the corre-
sponding test scenario. With this understanding, a complete test 
scenario description will have four components:  
1. Scenery  
2. Environment  
3. Dynamic elements  
4. Pass criteria  
5. Additional context 
Scenery defines all geo-spatially stationary objects in the Operational 
Design Domain (ODD) of the vehicle [55], and includes attributes like 
road layouts, road furniture (e.g. barricades), traffic lights etc. Thus, 
scenery can be sub-categorised by various attributes (with their 
sub-attributes). Environment includes attributes such as weather, visi-
bility, connectivity etc. Selection of the scenery and environment con-
ditions to be used for testing is influenced by the ODD of the 
System-Under Test (SUT). While urban roads or city centres or 
motorway roads are part of scenery elements, if the ODD of a LSAD 
system includes urban roads and city centres, then the scenery param-
eters will be selected accordingly. However, it should be noted that the 
testing plan for the SUT also needs to include out-of-ODD situations or 
scenarios focussing on imminent ODD exit. For example, if the ODD of 
LSAD system only includes clear weather, SUT also needs to be tested in 
rainy weather to evaluate if the SUT can detect an out of ODD condition 
and respond appropriately. 
All moving objects and actors in the world comprise the dynamic 
elements category [55]. Dynamic elements are sub-categorised by 
various parameters. Fig. 2 illustrates the top-level scenery attribute 
parametrisation. At the top-level, scenery can be classified into drivable 
area, junctions, zones, fixed road structures, temporary road structures 
and special structures attributes [62]. Fig. 3 illustrates the top-level 
dynamic elements parametrisation. At the top-level, dynamic elements 
can be classified into scripted traffic and non-scripted traffic. Scripted 
traffic refers to non-SUT agents which have pre-defined manoeuvres in 
the test scenario. Non-scripted traffic refers to agents which may be part 
of a traffic model or an actor model without predefined path. 
The scenery and the dynamic elements for the test scenario are 
selected from the library based on the defined Operational Design 
Domain (ODD) of the SUT (in STPA step 1). The scenery and the dy-
namic elements together form the base world for the test scenario and 
their corresponding parameters depending upon the ODD form the base 
parameters for a test scenario. The pass criterion defines the set of 
conditions (internal to SUT or external to SUT) for which the test sce-
nario will be considered as a pass. Additional context refers to the 
context element of the UCA (STPA step 3) and the causal factors for 
“Potential control action not followed / How could this happen” in STPA 
step four. 
3.1. Additional context test scenario parameters 
As mentioned in section 2.3, an Unsafe Control Action (UCA) is 
structured into four components. As an example, let us consider the UCA 
illustrated in Fig. 4 – “GPP doesn’t provide waypoint design area when there 
are obstacles on the path and pod is moving”. Here GPP refers to “Global 
Path Planner” and “pod” refers to a low-speed automated driving system 
equipped vehicle, i.e. shuttle. 
Test scenario parameters are identified for the scenery, environment, 
dynamic elements (both as per the ODD defined in STPA step one) and 
the additional context. It should be noted that additional context pa-
rameters have a higher priority over base parameters and the assump-
tions made in base parameters. The additional context comes from both 
STPA step three (from the UCA) and STPA step four. One of the pa-
rameters identified for the additional context is the “context (C1)” of a 
UCA (Fig. 4). In the example in Fig. 4, the content element is “…when 
there are obstacles on the path and pod is moving”. The corresponding 
parametrisation of “pod is moving” and “overlapping distance of obstacle 
and the pod path” is done with respect to pod trajectory and pod velocity. 
Overlapping distance, trajectory and velocity form the additional 
context parameters for the test scenario. 
In another UCA example (Fig. 5) concerning LPP (Local Path 
Planner), the “context element (C1)” of the UCA is: “pod is moving and is 
around a bend”. The corresponding parameter for “around a bend” is the 
base map, which is a scenery element of the scenario. In this case, the 
base map (radius of curvature) is a STPA specific parameter for the test 
scenario. The other context elements like in Fig. 4, are the pod trajectory 
Fig. 1. Structure of an Unsafe Control Action (UCA)  
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and pod velocity which refer to the “pod is moving” context. The dif-
ference between an STPA specific parameter and a base parameter is 
that in the execution of test cases for the test scenario, the STPA specific 
parameters will have a higher resolution when parameter values are 
chosen and base parameters will have a lower resolution (or random 
selection depending on the defined ODD) during test scenario execution. 
The second part of the “additional context” for the test scenario 
comes from STPA step four analysis. An example step 4 analysis is dis-
cussed below for UCA# 15b1. 
UCA# 15b1: Global Path Planning (GPP) doesn’t provide way-points 
path command when destination command is present. – [L2, L3] 
Process Model believes (B1):  
• GPP believes that a path is not possible for the given destination, 
current pose and base map inputs. (15b1.B1.1)  
• GPP believes that destination command is not present. (15b1.B1.2)  
• Etc. 
Process Model believes that because (B2): For the process model 
belief 15b1.B1.1, potential reasons for the belief include:  
• GPP believes that because it can’t resolve a path in the current base 
map. (15b1.B2.1)  
• GPP believes that because destination is out of bounds as per the 
current base map. (15b1.B2.2)  
• Etc. 
Causal Factors (B3): Causal factors leading to loss scenarios include 
identifying why would a control action not be followed or how could the 
reason for the process model belief occur. For process model belief 15b1. 
B2.1, the causal factors include:  
• This could occur due to incorrect current pose provided to GPP. This 
could be because localization provides pose which doesn’t match the 
ground truth. This could be because all sensor feeds are delayed in 
time leading to a low covariance error as they are coherent (sug-
gesting the pose is correct).  
• This could occur due to incorrect base map in the pod. 
Fig. 2. Test scenario attributes for parametrisation (top level)  
Fig. 3. Dynamic element attributes for parametrisation (top level)  
Fig. 4. Example 1: Unsafe Control Action from STPA of Low-Speed Automated Driving system [UCA# 14a]  
Fig. 5. Example 2: Unsafe Control Action from STPA of Low-Speed Automated Driving system [UCA# 8b]  
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• Etc. 
For the second part of the additional context for the test scenario, the 
“Potential control action not followed” or “how the situation could happen” 
B3 element of STPA step four is parametrised. E.g. if the “how” element 
is: “sensor feed was delayed” [UCA# 15b1], then the parametrisation of 
“type of sensor feed” and “delay time” is done for the test scenario. 
3.2. Pass / fail criteria for the test scenario 
The pass criteria for the test scenario are identified from STPA step 
four. One aim of the STPA process is to identify safety requirements to 
prevent a UCA from happening (if possible). Consider a control loop 
(with controller with process model and control algorithm, controlled 
process, actuator and a sensor). For a UCA to occur, the process model of 
the controller could represent a belief that makes the control action it is 
directing appear to be safe (when actually it is unsafe, i.e. a UCA). Let us 
call this belief as B1. If B1 were not true, the controller would not direct 
the original control action (i.e., original UCA). Therefore, one of the pass 
criterion for the test scenario would be defined as the negation of the 
belief B1 (process model belief), i.e., B1́, as identified in STPA step four. 
Secondly, the process model has the belief (B1) because of some reasons. 
Let us call these reasons causing the process model belief B1 as B2. Once 
again, if these reasons B2 were not true, B1 would not be true (when 
treated recursively) and subsequently, the controller would not direct 
the UCA. Thus, the second pass criterion for the test scenario is the 
negation of the reasons for the process model belief, i.e., B2́. Thus, the 
two pass criteria for the test scenario coming out of STPA step four for 
each UCA are B1́ and B2́. Therefore, the pass criteria for the test sce-
narios is the negation of the “process model belief” and negation of the 
“reason for the process model belief”. It is possible that there could be 
multiple process model beliefs causing the UCA and multiple corre-
sponding reasons for those beliefs. In such a situation, there will be more 
than one test scenario for a single UCA and each test scenario will have 
its corresponding pass criteria. Table 2 illustrates the pass criteria based 
on UCA# 15b1. 
The test scenario description (based on UCA# 15b1) can also be 
written in the following notation (Table 3): 
The test scenario described in Table 3, involves adding delay in 
various sensor(s) feed(s). These test scenarios evaluate if the covariance 
error detects the mismatch between the ground truth and the current 
pose calculated based on the sensor feed (which has been delayed). The 
number of test scenarios (in Table 3) is calculated using the combination 
formula of selecting “k (= 1 - 4)” parameters from a given set of “n (n =
4)” number of parameters. As each test scenario has its corresponding 
“pass criterion”, the number of test scenarios are doubled due to two 
pass criteria to obtain the total number of test scenarios. 
4. Applying proposed test scenario generation method to a Low- 
Speed Automated Driving System: A Real-World Case Study 
In order to evaluate the applicability of the proposed method to 
create test scenarios, the method was applied to a real-world automated 
driving system as a case study. In this case-study, Aurrigo Driverless 
Technology’s fully automated Low-Speed Automated Driving (LSAD) 
system similar to Fig. 6, was the system under consideration or the 
system under test (SUT). As discussed in section 1.1, in order to apply the 
proposed method to create test scenarios using Hazard Based Testing, 
first STPA of the LSAD system was conducted. 
4.1. STPA Step 1: LSAD system 
The first step involves defining the system, the losses and corre-
sponding system hazards. The Aurrigo LSAD system is an SAE Level 4 
system, i.e., it is fully autonomous in a dedicated Operational Design 
Domain (ODD). The dedicated ODD for the LSAD system was its 
predefined routes in an urban environment. Additionally, the larger 
mobility system (of which each LSAD system was a part) consisted of 
a dispatcher, web-server and a fleet supervisor. The LSAD system 
equipped vehicle had electric propulsion with brake-by-wire and 
steer-by-wire functionality. It had a diverse range of sensors 
including multiple LiDAR and Cameras as a part of its sensor suite. 
For the Aurrigo LSAD system the following were identified as losses:  
1 Collision with objects outside the vehicle or damage to vehicle (L1)  
2 Not completing the journey with passenger and cargo (L2)  
3 Time of journey being too long, i.e., service target not met (L3)  
4 Loss of life or serious injury to people (L4) 
The corresponding system hazards were identified as: 
Table 2 
Pass criteria for test scenario based on process model belief and reasons for the 
process model belief  
Unsafe Control Action 
(UCA) 
Process Model: belief 
and its reasons 
Pass criteria 
Global Path Planning 
(GPP) doesn’t provide 
way-points path 
command when 
destination command is 
present. – [H2, H3, H5] 
B1 GPP believes that a path 
is not possible for the given 
destination, current pose 
and base map inputs. 
B1’ GPP SHALL believe 
that a path is possible for 
the given destination, 
current pose and base map 
inputs 
B2 GPP believes that 
because it can’t resolve a 
path in the current base 
map. 
B2’ GPP SHALL believe 
that because it CAN resolve 
a path in the current base 
map.  
Table 3 
Test Scenario based on UCA# 12a depicted in Table 2  
Scenery Urban areas 
Dynamic elements Pedestrians, vehicles (random selection) 
Context Obstacle position 
Type of sensor feed 
Sensor feed delay time 
Base map 
Pass criteria (PC) for Test Scenario PC1: GPP SHALL believe that a path is possible for the given destination, current pose and base map inputs. 
PC2: GPP SHALL believe that because it CAN resolve a path in the current base map. 
Number of Test Scenario Parameters 4 
Number of Test Scenarios (4C1 + 4C2 + 4C3 + 4C4 = 15) x 2 (number of pass criteria) = 14 
or 
(2k – 1) x 2, where k is the number of parameters (for corresponding B1` and B2`)  
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1 Vehicle does not maintain safe distance from nearby objects (H1) – 
Linked to L1  
2 Vehicle enters dangerous area/region (H2) – Linked to L1  
3 Vehicle exceeds safe operating envelope for environment (speed, 
lateral/longitudinal forces) (H3) – Linked to L1, L2, L3  
4 Vehicle occupants exposed to harmful effects and/or health hazards 
(e.g. fire, excessive temperature, inability to escape, door closes on 
passengers, etc.) (H4) – Linked to L4  
5 Vehicle does not follow an efficient, complete path to destination 
(H5) – Linked to L2, L3 
Loss 2 and Loss 3 were defined as losses as the Aurrigo LSAD system 
is a part of a larger mobility service system. An incomplete journey or if a 
journey takes too long would lead to loss of customer satisfaction which 
will ultimately lead to loss of revenue for the business (mobility service). 
This is an important aspect of STPA as it can capture causal factors for 
social-technical losses also. 
4.2. STPA Step 2: LSAD system 
STPA step 2 involves creating a control structure of the system under 
test (SUT), i.e., Aurrigo’s LSAD system. One of the most important aspect 
of the control structure development is the identification of the in-
teractions (control actions and feedback) between the subsystems. The 
LSAD control structure can be classified into five different components 
(Fig. 7). The first component consists of the “world” in which the LSAD is 
being deployed. The second component is the “raw sensing, i.e. sensors” 
of the world in which the LSAD is being deployed. The third component 
is the “autonomous control system” of the LSAD. The forth component is 
the “LSAD actuation system” which responds to the autonomous control 
system to make the LSAD to move in the world. The fifth component is 
the “human input, i.e. customer” to the LSAD. 
In order to refine the control structure within the LSAD (a.k.a. pod) 
system, first the various sub-systems needed to be identified. These 
subsystems are: customer, sensors, daily authorizer, world, Autonomous 
Control System (ACS) and LSAD actuation (Fig. 8). The ACS is comprised 
of a remote operator, authorizer, localization, obstacle detection clas-
sifier, global path planner, local path planner and a kinematic model. 
LSAD actuation is comprised of vehicle management system, steering 
sensor estimator, braking pressure estimator and a motor torque 
estimator. 
The control actions and feedback interactions between the LSAD sub- 
systems are captured in Fig. 8. In Fig. 8, red arrows indicate control 
actions and green arrows indicate feedbacks. The STPA analysis carried 
out as a part of this research involved the sensors, fleet supervisor, world 
and the autonomous control systems subsystems. The analysis discussed 
in this section is for a part of the autonomous control system as depicted 
in the highlighted region in Fig. 9. 
4.3. STPA Step 3: LSAD system 
STPA step three involves analysing each control action to identify 
Unsafe Control Actions (UCAs). For the autonomous control system part 
of the LSAD system, analysis of 12 control actions (in Fig. 8) for each of 
the four general cases discussed in section 2.3 resulted in 70 UCAs. Some 
of the control actions resulted in more than one UCA for a particular 
general case. For the purpose of this paper (and due to confidentiality 
reasons), only the UCAs for the control actions (highlighted in Fig. 8) are 
discussed. Some of the identified UCAs are illustrated in Table 4. Table 4 
captures the analysis of the control actions (e.g. destination command, 
way-points path command, way-point design area command and 
requested kinematic command) in the four general cases discussed in 
section 2.3. The columns represent one type of the mentioned general 
cases. It should be noted that depending on the context element of the 
UCA, multiple UCAs may be identified for the same general cases (for 
example two UCAs have been mentioned for the control action “way- 
points path command” for the general case “providing causes loss”.). 
For the eight control actions identified in Fig. 9, 51 Unsafe Control 
Fig. 7. High-level control structure of LSAD  
Fig. 6. Low-Speed Automated Driving (LSAD) system (a.k.a. pod) (Image 
courtesy: Aurrigo Driverless Technology) 
S. Khastgir et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Reliability Engineering and System Safety 215 (2021) 107610
8
Actions were identified, with eleven UCAs being associated with a single 
control action – “requested kinematic command”. Other control actions 
like “way point design area” had four UCAs associated with them, while 
control actions “destination” and “validated brake request” had two and 
10 UCAs associated with them respectively. 
4.4. STPA Step 4: LSAD system 
After identifying the UCAs (section 4.3), the reasons for the occur-
rence of the UCAs were identified as part of STPA step four. In this 
section, loss scenarios are identified and analysis for some of the UCAs 
have been illustrated. A loss scenario describes the causal factors that 
Fig. 8. STPA control structure for LSAD system  
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can lead to the unsafe control actions and to hazards [35]. As discussed 
in section 2.4, in order to identify loss scenarios that involve process 
models, the “process model belief” and the “reasons for the process model 
belief” are identified. 
4.4.1. Loss Scenarios for UCA# 15a 
UCA# 15a: Local Path Planning (LPP) doesn’t provide kinematic 
action (braking) when there is a valid local path and the pod is moving 
and there is an obstacle in front. – [H1, H2, H4, H5] 
Process Model believes (B1): Three different process model beliefs 
to trigger the UCA to happen:  
• LPP believes that obstacles are not in vehicle trajectory. (15aB1.1)  
• LPP believes that there is a safe distance between current position of 
the vehicle and the obstacle (which is on vehicle trajectory). 
(15aB1.2)  
• LPP believes that it is providing the kinematic action (braking). 
(15aB1.3)  
• Etc. 
Process Model believes that because (B2): For the process model 
belief 15a.B1.1, a potential reason for the belief could be:  
• LPP believes that because the OD Classifier doesn’t provide detected 
obstacles vector when obstacle is in vehicle trajectory and the 
Covariance Error is low (i.e., sensor data is coherent).  
• Etc. 
Causal Factors (B3): Possible causal factors for B2 (for 15a.B1.1) to 
be true:  
• This could be because historical data of the pose and the surface 
probability shows no collision. Low Covariance Error could be 
because all sensor feeds are delayed in time leading to a low 
covariance error as they are coherent.  
• This could be because OD Classifier believes that surface probability 
has not been present long enough for it to classify as an obstacle. This 
could be because of sudden changes in pose (acceleration or 
deceleration) or sudden appearance of surfaces (due to acceleration 
or deceleration of other entities). 
• This could be because OD Classifier believes that the surface prob-
ability has no obstacles. This could be because the obstacles are 
occluded in some way. 
For the process model belief 15a.B1.2, a potential reason for the 
belief (B2) could be:  
• LPP believes that because the resolution of current pose provided by 
localisation (incorrect) and the detected obstacles vector OD Clas-
sifier suggests so.  
• Etc. 
Causal Factors (B3): Possible causal factors for B2 (for 15a.B1.2) to 
be true:  
• This could be because localization provides pose which doesn’t 
match the ground truth. This could be due to a featureless environ-
ment or repeating features or base map being incorrect. 
4.4.2. Loss Scenarios for UCA# 15b1 
UCA# 15b1: LPP provides kinematic action (acceleration) when there is 
no valid local plan. – [H1, H2, H4, H5] 
Process Model believes (B1): Two different process model beliefs to 
trigger the UCA to happen:  
• LPP believes that it is not providing the kinematic action (acceleration). 
(15b1B1.1)  
• LPP believes that the local plan is valid. (15b1B1.2)  
• Etc. 
Process Model believes that because (B2): For the process model 
belief 15b1.B1.1, a potential reason for the belief could be:  
• LPP believes that because LPP is not publishing the kinematic action 
(acceleration).  
• Etc. 
Fig. 9. Highlighted Region of the LSAD system control structure  
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Causal Factors (B3): Possible causal factors for B2 (for 15b1.B1.1) 
to be true:  
• This could be because the kinematic model is subscribing to a wrong 
message from LPP instead of the kinematic action (acceleration) 
message. This could be because of change in pointers or message IDs 
or communication error.  
• This could be because the LPP algorithm is faulty and it is indeed 
publishing the kinematic action (acceleration). This could be due to a 
missing feedback to the LPP algorithm about the message status. 
For the process model belief 15b1.B1.2, a potential reason for the 
belief (B2) could be:  
• LPP believes that because it can resolve the local path plan on to the 
base map.  
• Etc. 
Causal Factors (B3): Possible causal factors for B2 (for 15b1.B1.2) 
to be true:  
• This could be because the way-point path command is invalid. This 
could be due to a wrong base-map providing incorrect ground truth.  
• This could be because LPP is receiving a set of coherent inputs as the 
covariance error is low. This could be because all sensor feeds are 
delayed in time leading to a low covariance error as they are 
coherent.  
• This could be because the detected obstacles command is invalid. 
This could be due to an incorrect pose calculation.  
• This could be because the way-point design area command is invalid 
as it doesn’t describe the route constraints correctly in real time. 
4.5. Creating test scenarios and test scenario parameters 
The “loss scenarios” identified in section 4.4 will now be used as 
inputs to identify test scenarios and test scenario parameters for the 
subject under test. It must be noted that loss scenarios are distinct from 
test scenarios. As discussed in section 3, a test scenario in an ADS context 
is the description of a driving situation that includes the actors, scenery, 
environment, objectives and sequences of events, along with the eval-
uation criteria. A loss scenario may involve a UCA and explains the 
causes of hazards and losses. Loss scenarios may not have all the attri-
butes of a test scenario. 
Once the UCAs and their corresponding causal factors are identified, 
the next step involves parametrisation for test scenario creation. As 
discussed in section 3, a test scenario is comprised of scenery elements, 
environment elements, dynamic elements, context and pass criteria. The 
base parameters are selected depending upon the ODD specification of 
the LSAD. In this case study, the LSAD’s ODD included urban areas with 
pre-determined routes only. 
Parametrisation for test scenario generation involves para-
metrisation of the context element of the UCA and the parametrisation of 
the “Potential control action not followed / How could this happen” element 
(i.e. additional context). In this section, some of the UCAs identified in 
Table 4 with their corresponding causal reasons identified in section 4.4 
are parametrised for test scenario creation. Additionally, the corre-
sponding pass criteria are also identified by negating the process model 
belief and reasons for the belief as identified in section 4.4. Table 5 
captures the test scenario parameters and their pass criteria. The test 
scenario representation of the Table 5 could also be made similar to 
Table 3. 
Based on the parameters identified for each of the test scenarios, test 
cases can be created by assigning values to each of the parameters. While 
the parameter value selection process is out of scope of this research, 
some of the potential approaches are discussed in section 5. Applying the 
proposed extension method (discussed in section 3) to STPA of the LSAD 
system (Fig. 9), for the six control actions, over 250 parameters were 
identified which lead to the creation of over 3000 test scenarios (using 
the expression in Table 3). While 3000 test scenarios may seem a large 
number for manufacturers to test, it represents a significant reduction 
from the set of all theoretically possible test scenarios (with or without 
any loss or safety concern) down to the most critical test scenarios that 
describe exactly how the SUT can cause losses and how it must respond 
to prevent them. In this sense, the STPA inspired test scenario generation 
was found to be very effective in identifying the specific test scenarios 
that are the most critical to test. In addition, the 3000 test scenarios can 
Table 4 
UCA table with some of the UCAs identified for the LSAD system  
Control Action Not Providing causes a loss Providing causes a loss Too early, too late, out of sequence 
causes a loss 
Stopped too soon or applied too 
long causes a loss 
Destination 
command 
[UCA# 4a] Occupant doesn’t provide 
destination command when occupant 
needs to undertake a journey. - [H5] 
[..] 
[UCA# 4b] Occupant provides destination 
command when that is unachievable or 






[UCA# 13a] Global Path Planning 
(GPP) doesn’t provide way-points path 
command when destination command is 
present. – [H2, H3, H5] 
[..] 
[UCA# 13b.1] GPP provide incorrect 
way-points path command when 
destination command is present. – [H2, 
H3, H5] [UCA# 13a] GPP provides new 







[UCA# 14a] Global Path Planning 
(GPP) doesn’t provide design area when 
there are obstacles on the path and the 
pod is moving. – [H1, H2, H5] 
[..] 
[UCA# 14b] Global Path Planning (GPP) 
provides large design area when there are 
obstacles on the path and when design area 
is larger than driveable area. – [H1, H2, 
H4, H5] [..] 
[UCA# 14c] Global Path Planning 
(GPP) provides larger design area too 
early before the actual drivable area has 
increased and there is an obstacle in front 
and pod is moving. – [H1, H2, H4, H5] 
[..] 
[UCA# 14d] Global Path Planning 
(GPP) stops providing design area 
too soon before vehicle has stopped 
and there is obstacle along the 






[UCA# 15a] Local Path Planning 
(LPP) doesn’t provide kinematic action 
(braking) when there is a valid local 
path and the pod is moving and there is 
an obstacle in front. – [H1, H2, H4, 
H5] 
[..] 
[UCA# 15b1] LPP provides kinematic 
action (acceleration) when there is no 
valid local plan. – [H1, H2,, H4, H5] 
[UCA# 15b2] LPP provides kinematic 
action when vehicle is not following the 
correct local plan. – [H1, H2, H3, H5]  
[..] 
[UCA# 15c1] LPP provides kinematic 
action (brak ing) too late after conflict is 
unavoidable when there is an obstacle in 
front and pod is moving. – [H1, H2, H3, 
H4, H5]  
[..] 
[UCA# 15d1] LPP stops kinematic 
action (steering) too soon before 
turn is complete when turning 
around a bend. – [H1, H2, H4, H5]  
[..]  
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potentially be executed in variety of environments (e.g. simulation, test 
tracks or real-world testing including field operational tests). The 
feasibility of using such a large dataset and their selection for execution 
across test environments in discussed further in section 5. 
It is important to highlight that this paper does not make any argu-
ment claiming that 3000 scenarios or any specific number of test sce-
narios are required for proving safety of an automated driving system. 
On the contrary, we argue that the test scenarios produced via the 
proposed STPA extension method, will uncover actual weakness or flaws 
in the system, instead of using a random scenario generation method or 
using a Monte-Carlo style approach where the hope is that throwing 
enough test cases is going to catch the problems. 
5. Discussion 
For real-world systems, there is a need to create the knowledge of the 
true capabilities and limitations of ADASs and ADSs. This knowledge can 
be created by evaluating such systems in various test scenarios to 
establish their capability to tackle them, leading to a state of “informed 
safety” [25]. However complex systems like ADASs and ADSs require 
new testing methods and ways to identify test scenarios [27]. Hazard 
Based Testing (HBT) has been proposed for ADASs and ADSs as a method 
to identify “how a system fails (or misbehaves)” to identify test scenarios. 
Hazard identification is the first stage of HBT. There are various methods 
for hazard identification (e.g. STPA, FMEA, FTA, ETA, HAZOP etc.). In 
this paper, Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) method has been 
chosen as most appropriate for complex systems like ADASs and ADSs. 
For creating test scenarios from hazards and loss scenarios, an 
extension to STPA is presented in this paper. In order to create test 
scenarios: two levels of parametrisation are performed. Firstly, base 
parametrisation is conducted to create the scenery and the dynamic 
elements of a test scenario. Secondly, parametrisation of the elements of 
STPA output is done to create hazard based test scenario parameters. 
The proposed extension to STPA was aided by the existing structure of 
the Unsafe Control Actions (UCAs) identified by STPA step 3. The UCA 
structure (“controller, control action type, control action and context”), 
aided the parametrisation by highlighting the “context” element clearly. 
In order to evaluate the applicability of the proposed method, it was 
then applied to a real-world system (low-speed automated driving sys-
tem). In order to conduct the STPA of the LSAD system, the LSAD 
manufacturer – Aurrigo provided the system knowledge and expertise. 
Through a systems engineering approach adopted by STPA, the method 
was able to identify many of the situations which would have been 
missed by some of the traditional methods, thus reducing the “unknown 
unknowns” space by increasing the “known knowns” space. Additionally, 
“known unknowns” are often interpreted as the risks that we are aware 
of, in other words the risky scenarios that we already recognize but may 
have some uncertainty about the consequences. STPA will capture these 
risky scenarios that we already know about. But the key benefit from 
STPA is its ability to also capture new scenarios that nobody has thought 
of before or that nobody had the insight to identify as a risky scenario in 
the first place—the “unknown unknowns”. Thus, hazard-based test sce-
narios via STPA and its proposed extension complements test scenarios 
identified via requirement based testing approach, increasing the 
“known knowns”. 
STPA process also enables the identification of system safety re-
quirements from both step 3 (via UCAs) and step 4 (via causal factors) in 
order to prevent the hazards [1,40]. For a safe operation of the ADS, 
there would be a need to prevent or detect the causal factors identified in 
step 4, which will provide further safety requirements for the system. 
Along with safety requirements, the STPA process also highlights a set of 
assumptions of the system. Monitoring the validity of these assumptions 
Table 5 
Generating Test Scenarios for the LSAD system  
STPA Results Test Scenario Generation 
UCA selected  
for generating test  
scenarios 
Context from B3  
(to be used for Test 
Scenarios) 
Context from 
UCA (to be 
used for Test 
Scenarios) 
Test scenario parameters 
based on UCA context 
Test Scenario 
parameters based  
on B3 
Pass Criterion 1 Pass Criterion 2           
[UCA# 15a] Local 
Path Planning (LPP) 
doesn’t provide 
kinematic action 
(braking) when there 
is a valid local path 
and the pod is 
moving and there is 
an obstacle in front. 
– [H1, H2, H4, H5] 
…This could be 
because sensor feed is 
delayed in time.         
… This could be 
because of sudden 
changes in pose 
(acceleration or 
deceleration) or 
sudden appearance of 
surfaces (due to 
acceleration or 
deceleration of other 
entities).    
… This could be 
because the obstacles is 
occluded in some way.   
… This could be 
because it is featureless 
or repeating features or 
base map incorrect.            
when there is a 
valid local path 
and the pod is 
moving and 
there is an 
obstacle in front             
Obstacle position  
Velocity  
Delay time Type of sensor 
delayed         
Acceleration rate of SV  
Deceleration rate of SV  
Acceleration rate of other 
actors  
Deceleration rate of other 
actors        
Amount of occlusion   
Amount of features in the 
world.  
Amount of difference in 
base map. 
OD Classifier shall not believe 
that the obstacle is not in vehicle 
trajectory (i.e., pose and 
surface probability don’t 
collide).       
OD Classifier shall not believe 
that surface probability has not 
been present long enough for it 
to classify as an obstacle.           
OD Classifier shall not believe 
that the surface probability has 
no obstacles.  
Covariance Error 
shall not be low.        
OD Classifier shall 
not believe that 
because that the 
obstacle is initially 
hard to 
discriminate.        
OD Classifier shall 
not believe that 
because no change 
in surface 
probability or the 
calculated vectors 
don’t collide.  
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indicate the potential for an accident, e.g. monitoring the ODD of the 
ADS [32]. 
The application of the proposed method for a SAE level 4 automation 
LSAD system led to the creation of over 3000 test scenarios. While this 
may be considered a large set for execution in real-world testing, there is 
a need to understand which test scenarios (out of over 3000 identified) 
should be executed in real-world or test track testing. There is a wide 
consensus in industry and research community about the major role 
played by simulation based testing in the evaluation of ADSs [53]. This 
is due to potential reduction in the resource investment for test track and 
real-world testing. Thus, an important area of future research includes 
creating a methodology to select test scenarios across different test en-
vironments (e.g. simulation, test tracks and real-world testing). One 
potential approach includes using the identified hazard-based test sce-
narios in a simulation environment to identify the values of test scenario 
parameters for which the system fails. If one can identify parameter 
value combinations for which the system will fail, only those combi-
nations of parameter values could be used for test track and real-world 
testing, leading to a reduction in the test scenario space. Therefore, an 
area of future research would involve creating an algorithm to select 
parameter values for the test scenario parameters which violated the 
pass criteria. Various white box and black box methods can be used for 
this type of parameter selection. One of the promising techniques is 
Bayesian Optimisation (BO), which converts the parameter selection 
problem into an optimisation problem [17]. Alternatively, other ap-
proaches like using constrained random testing may also be used for 
parameter identification [29] Additionally, each individual test scenario 
may not require a unique test execution run as multiple test scenarios 
could be evaluated using the same test execution run. 
The quality of the test scenarios is based on the quality of the method 
(i.e. extended - STPA) used for test scenario generation. In other words, 
the test scenario quality is judged based on their coverage over the 
causes of losses. It is not based on the number of tests alone, but by 
examining how well the individual test scenario characteristics align 
with the actual causes of losses. Studies undertaking comparisons of 
various safety analysis methods have already shown that STPA has more 
coverage in identifying system flaws as compared to other approaches 
[20,41]. 
Future research may include formalising the “context” element of the 
UCA (in step 3) and the causal factors (in step 4). Formalisation would 
assist in automation of the test scenario parameter identification pro-
cesses and may lead to automatically populating test scenarios param-
eters in Table 5. Furthermore, future research to address the dynamic 
nature of complex systems like ADSs due to Over-The-Air (OTA) up-
dates, sensor ageing or degradation, software ageing etc. is another 
promising research area [30,39,49]. The dynamic changes may poten-
tially be in the system itself or in its operating environment, with per-
formance quality, failure robustness, mission completion capability 
being the objectives that may be optimised [37,61]. By monitoring the 
system assumptions, an STPA of a dynamic system can be accommo-
dated either by iterations in the control structure (step 2) followed by 
step 3 and step 4 of the affected parts or by step 4 analysis of causal 
factors. The former will be true for system changes due to OTA, while the 
latter would deal with sensor and software ageing. 
6. Conclusion 
The literature has suggested that to test an ADS in order to assess its 
safety and prove that it is 20% better than human driven vehicle, it 
needs to be driven for over 11 billion miles [24]. Hazard Based Testing 
(HBT) and the tradition of sociotechnical systems instead suggest that 
the number of miles driven, by itself is not a meaningful metric for 
judging confidence in ADAS or ADS. Rather the types of scenarios 
encountered by an ADS during testing are critically important as the 
focuses needs to be on “how a system fails (or misbehaves)”. The nature of 
scenarios is fundamental to an assessment of safety. 
The concept of Hazard Based Testing (HBT) involves creating hazard 
based test scenarios. To identify hazards, Systems Theoretic Process 
Analysis (STPA) was used as it has been demonstrated to identify haz-
ards that might be missed by other hazard identification methods like 
FMEA, FTA, HAZOP, ETA etc. especially for complex systems involving 
human-automation interaction. Grounded in systems engineering and 
controls engineering, STPA is a four step process which considers safety 
as a control problem in which control flaws can lead to an accident/loss. 
STPA identifies Unsafe Control Actions (UCA) and their causal factors. 
This paper proposes an extension to STPA to create test scenarios for 
each of the UCAs identified as a part of the STPA method. The proposed 
method also identifies pass criteria for the test scenarios. The proposed 
test scenario consists of 1) scenery 2) environment 3) dynamic elements 
4) additional context and 5) pass criteria. The scenery, environment and 
dynamic elements are selected according to the Operational Design 
Domain (ODD) of the vehicle. Additional context is selected from the 
STPA output (context element in step 3 and causal factors in step 4). 
STPA specific parameters have a higher priority over ODD parameters 
and override them. The proposed method was applied to a real-world 
case study of a Low-Speed Automated Driving (LSAD) system. The 
STPA analysis of a part of the Autonomous Control System of the LSAD 
system with eight control actions yielded 51 Unsafe Control Actions. 
This corresponded to the creation of over 3000 test scenarios with over 
250 parameters associated with them. 
This paper doesn’t make any argument for the number of test sce-
narios needed for proving safety of an ADS. The test scenarios produced 
via the proposed STPA - extension method, are a targeted approach to 
uncover actual weakness and flaws in the ADS, as compared to random 
(or constrained random) scenario generation where the hope is to 
stimulate the system with as many test scenarios as possible to catch 
flaws. Thus, making the proposed extended - STPA based method more 
efficient in uncovering system flaws. 
Future work can explore techniques for grouping similar scenarios, 
and identifying the most critical ones to be tested. This would comple-
ment the systems-based framework described here, which has been 
constructed to offer a valid, robust, and efficient hazard-based approach 
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